absence of a model of freedom acceptable to psychiatry and the law, seem to contribute much to the misunderstandings between the two professions in the field of mental illness and human freedom. Therefore it is no surprise to find that lawyers and psychiatrists become idle and useless to the patient and to the public while they are enga~ed in th~ir Sisyphean task to define their. respective areas of competence concernlOg human freedom.
This paper constitutes an attempt to stimulate a discussion of this topic with the objective of overcoming the existing stalemate and moving towards a solution which would allow both professions to conceptualize human freedom from a different viewpoint.
Following a definition of terms a model of a concept of human freedom is offered, postulating the existence of two levels of freedom. A basic (animal) principle and a governing (human) principle are presented, the sum total of which constitutes 'human freedom' or 'liberty'. It is hypothesized that human freedom cannot exist without the guidance and the control of the g~ve~n ing principle. Consequently a restnctl?n of the basic principle may not necessanly indicate a deprivation of human freedom. In the same vein a compulsory mental hospital admission which restricts~he basic part of human freedom, ( Canad. Psychiat, Ass. J. Vol. 14 (1969) the impaired governing principle and so restitute human freedom. The proposed change of the concept of human freedom is believed to gradually dissolve the prejudice toward the mental patient and to change the status of the mental health professional from jailer to therapist.
The need for a change of basic concepts is stressed in this paper.
Introduction
Commendable concern is expressed in the psychiatric literature about the individual's freedom and its possible restriction in mental illness. While contrasting views are expressed about the merits and disadvantages of compulsory admissions to psychiatric institutions, the reader feels dismayed about the lack of agreement on even basic issues (2, 7) . The discussants seem to speak in different languages because of the absence of a definition of the terms of reference. The psychiatrist appears ambivalent towards the mental patient when he takes recourse to terms obviously borrowed from the judiciary (5) . He may claim he means 'treatment and/or protection of the patient and of his family' although his terms of reference as 'compulsion, detention and confinement' spell out punishment to both the representatives of the law and to the public. The psychiatrist and the lawyer find themselves deadlocked in their endeavours to define each other's roles and they may view each other with suspicion. The appalling lack of understanding and co-operation between these two professions hampers any progress in the field of mental health legislation, leaving the mental patients, those entrusted with their care and the public, exposed to ambivalence and hostility.
Definition of the Terms
However if we take a dispassionate look at the fundamental issues involved, Psychiatry and the Law will find themselves sitting in the same boat while serving the mental patient, his family and the community. In our concern about the arrangements for involuntary admissions, consideration should be given to the patient's ability to understand, appreciate and to exercise the duties and privileges embodied in his civil rights. Further the relationship of his civil rights to his natural rights deserves contemplation at this juncture. For instance, the right to be healthy pertains to the natural right of each individual. This natural right which includes the right to be protected from assault, insult and slander, takes preference over the individual's civil rights (1) .
The designations 'freedom' and 'liberty' are used interchangeably in the psychiatric literature. And yet 'liberty' appears to have the additional connotation of the 'to go within specified limits' in addition to the quality of 'being free from restraint' which applies to freedom (3, 4) .
The difference between 'freedom' and 'liberty' postulates two concepts, one which concerns itself with the absence or presence of coercion and the other which rests upon the premise that freedom of opinion and action from government intervention presupposes the ability to recognize and to acknowledge the same rights for other individuals, thus limiting one's own liberty which otherwise might encroach upon the civil rights of others. Offering this premise it behooves us to state that the concept of freedom, limiting itself to the absence or the presence of physical restrictions, applies to the animal kingdom and may be termed the 'basic principle of liberty' while the widened concept envisages a sense of responsibility, befits the realm of man and may be viewed as the 'governing principle of liberty'. The sense of re- 
A) 'Natural Right'
-never forfeited -takes preference over liberty -includes the right to be protected from assault, insult and slander (the right to be healthy) B) 'Lower Principle of Freedom' -freedom from coercion, restraint -acts without consideration of the interests of others C) 'Governing Principle of Freedom' -the essence of acceptable behaviour -guides, restrains the lower principle of freedom in favour of the interests of other individuals sponsibility or the 'governing principle of liberty' appears to be either impaired or obliterated in some mental disorders, thus potentially interfering with the natural right of the patient and with both the natural right and the liberty of others. In this light compulsory treatment measures constitute the means which control externally the 'basic principle of liberty' until the 'governing principle of liberty', with its internal controlling function, has been restored sufficiently to safeguard the patient's own and the natural right and the liberty of others. Consequently the need for a compulsory admission status expires once this limited aim, (which of course may not mean a cure of the psychiatric disorder), has been achieved. Stimulated by Ey's theo ries (8) Wijsenbeek postulated a distorted sense of freedom in mental disorders. He found an exaggerated sense of freedom in patients suffering from manic and schizophrenic reactions, suicidal reactions, personality disorders and acute brain syndromes. A decreased sense of freedom was-found in patients presenting depressive, catatonic, chronic schizophrenic reactions, character neurosis and chronic brain syndromes.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper attempts to invite a discussion of problems involving the intricate relationship between human freedom and mental illness. A definition of terms is offered to prepare the grounds for a useful exchange of opinions. The primary goal represents the effort to increase the psychiatrist's awareness of his own prejudice towards mental patients, which induced him to borrow terms used by the judiciary. The psychiatrist's commonly accepted (legal) concept of human freedom readily poses serious problems in cases of a compulsory admission. A concept of freedom which limits itself to the basic principle of freedom from coercion and restraint will render any compulsory hospital admission contestable. And yet any hospital admission, whether compulsory or noncompulsory, is a medical and/or psychiatric act, which does not warrant the involvement of the judiciary. Viewed from the premise of the widened concept of freedom offered above, the involvement of the law becomes superfluous and the psychiatrist is no longer the jailer of his patient. This viewpoint will help to gradually dissolve the existing prejudice of the professionals and of the public.
A distorted sense of freedom which is caused by either the impairment or the absence of the 'Governing Principle of Freedom', needs treatment. The 'Lower Principle of Freedom' needs to be controlled externally to prevent it from acting against the natural right of the patient's right to be healthy, or against other individuals' natural and civil rights. Assuming that the patient's sense of freedom-the appreciation of his own and the rights of others-is distorted through the nature of his psychiatric disorder, it appears logical to deduce that, for instance, a compulsory hospital admission cannot deprive him of what was distorted and disturbed before, and therefore constituted the reason for his admission. A compulsory hospital admission thus will help to restore sufficiently the 'Governing Principle of Freedom' to safeguard the patient's own and the natural right and the civil right of others. Consequently the need for a compulsory hospital admission expires once this limited aim, which of course may not mean a cure of the psychiatric disorder, has been achieved. At this stage the patient may be treated either in the hospital on a voluntary basis or he may be seen as an outpatient. Thus the 'Lower Principle of Freedom' has been effectively restrained until the 'Governing Principle of Freedom' has regained the control which is necessary to prevent destructive actions. The terms 'detention', 'confinement', 'parole', 'probation', etc. become obsolete because the patient was admitted for treatment.
Without a change of basic concepts even modern psychiatric hospitals and institutions will continue to be viewed with suspicion and contempt by both the professionals and the public. No matter how well equipped for treatment, research and teaching such institutions in future may be, they will remain isolated from the community.
A revision of the prevailing views among the mental health professionals and the public is indicated.
